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During the last decade, labor rights have gained increased salience in the 
international trade agenda. The issue of the linkage between trade and labor forcefully 
emerged during the 1990s at the domestic, regional and multilateral level, giving way 
to a highly polemical debate on whether or not a social clause should be included in 
trade agreements.  
 
Various factors account for the increasing relevance of labor matters. On the 
institutional side, the question is part of a broader trend, namely, the expansion of the 
international trade agenda from traditional tariff issues to various subjects (state 
support policies, intellectual property rights, competition policy and so on) that in the 
past belonged exclusively to the domestic policy arena. Environmental and labor 
market policies, usually depicted as the “social agenda”, are part of this trend. On 
more structural grounds, the closer integration of the world economy of the past two 
decades constraints the framework in which labor and wage policies are crafted, 
particularly in view of the need countries face to adapt to the increasingly stringent 
requirements of international competitiveness (Tokman, 1997). This is particularly 
telling in a context in which the rise of unemployment rates has become a virtually 
permanent feature of the policy agenda both in developed and developing countries. 
  
The increase of unemployment in industrialized countries is precisely the main 
driving force behind the claims against the unfair nature of different labor standards 
across nations and the moves favoring their harmonization. Simply stated, the under-
performance of labor markets in the industrialized world –which may take the form 
either of higher unemployment rates in Europe or precarious types of employment in 
the United States- has led many groups to view globalization and, particularly, 
competition from low wage countries as the source of their troubles (Rodrik, 1997). 
More concretely, the inability of developed countries’ labor markets, in which workers 
enjoy relatively high levels of protection, to provide “decent jobs” to wide segments of 
the population is just one side of the coin; the other is the weaker protection granted 
to workers in developing countries that underpins their competitive advantage based 
on lower labor costs. The corollary to this line of reasoning, fiercely opposed by many 
developing countries on different grounds, is that only the establishment of 
international disciplines on the subject will allow to thwart the deleterious 
consequences of different labor standards on trade and economic welfare. 
 
However, like in many other issues of the current trade agenda (see, for 
instance, Hoekman 2002), the question is not as straightforward as the former lines 
suggest, involving several highly arguably ethical, economic and developmental 
considerations. This paper addresses some of these questions with the aim of 
providing an updated overview of the discussion. The first section succinctly depicts 
the evolution of international efforts to deal with the issue, focusing in particular on 
trade multilateral negotiations. Section two examines the debate about the 
harmonization of labor standards, pointing out its major threads and considerations. 
Section three looks at scholarly efforts to grasp the relationship between trade and 
labor standards, including empirical analyses seeking to measure the economic and 
welfare impact of differential labor standards. Section four addresses the way the issue 
has been dealt with in major initiatives of economic integration within the region. The 
paper concludes by discussing alternative ways that have been recently advocated to 




The issue of the linkage between trade and workers’ rights is hardly a new one, 
being the matter of several negotiation and regulatory initiatives for more than a 
century. Indeed, during the period running from the late nineteenth century to the 
1930s various episodes took place, starting with the German invitation to other 
European nations to negotiate in Berlin common labor standards. The attempt, 
however, was not successful as an agreement could not be reached. In the wake of 
the twentieth century, the Treaty of Versailles meant the second significant instance in 
that direction, by including international labor standards in Part  XIII of its text, largely 
as a result of the fears raised by the Russian Revolution (Woolcock, 1995). Unilateral 
initiatives followed suit during the 1920s as many European countries implemented 
import duties against products made under poor working conditions. Likewise, the first 
“Fair Labor Standards Act” proposals appeared in the United States in the thirties (Von 
Beers, 1998). The International Labor Organization (ILO), created in 1919, somehow 
crowned all these efforts by placing discussions on the issue at the multilateral level 
and producing conventions and recommendations seeking global recognition (on this, 
more below). 
 
Consideration of the issue in trade negotiation fora goes back, in turn, to the 
aftermath of the Second World War when the ill-fated Havana Charter -which created 
the International Trade Organization (ITO)- included provisions regarding labor 
conditions and even allowed for trade sanctions1. Under the GATT framework, the only 
reference about the labor-trade issue was the ban on imports made by prison labor2. 
During the 1970s, however, the United States started to pressure for the inclusion of 
labor issues in the trade agenda. In line with this, the 1974 Trade Act, which granted 
the President the negotiating authority for the Tokyo Round, mandated the inclusion of 
labor standards in the negotiations.  
 
The United States’ efforts to place the issue on the multilateral trade agenda 
would materialize with French support during the Uruguay Round, where this 
contentious topic reemerged with considerable strength. During this Round, 
industrialized countries started to raise concerns about the unfair competitive 
advantage that lax or precarious labor regulations granted to developing nations. In 
1994, the relationship between the trading system and internationally recognized labor 
standards was included in the work program of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Preparatory Committee, at the request of several delegations. The issue would prove 
to be a matter of bitter arguments at the Singapore and Seattle Ministerial Meetings in 
1996 and 1999, respectively.   
 
                                                           
     1  Article I of the Havana Charter included as one of its goals the attainment of the higher standard of 
living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress. Article VII highlighted the 
importance of satisfactory social conditions for the well functioning of the international trading system 
(Mah, 1997). However, the Charter did not provide any definition of unfair labor standards, nor established 
sanctions (Latin American Economic System, 1994).  
 
     2  Article XX of GATT allowed the imposition of unilateral import ban on goods resulting from prison 
labor. 
At Singapore, the United States attempted to create a Working Group on Labor 
Standards but opposition from developing countries thwarted American efforts. The 
Declaration resulting from the Meeting rejected the protectionist use of labor standards  
and recognized the ILO as the competent body to monitor the compliance and 
enforcement of those standards. The Declaration also stated the WTO countries’ 
commitment to the observance of internationally recognized labor standards. This 
Declaration was a compromise solution that bridged the gap between the fiercely 
opposite stances of developed and developing countries on this matter3. Although at 
the moment it looked like the feud was settled, “the debate was not, however, to end 
in Singapore, and was to re-emerge across the three next ministerial meetings” 
(Wilkinson, 2002: 11). 
 
At the Seattle Ministerial Meeting, the United States tried to revive the issue, 
reiterating its demand for a working group on labor standards. The European Union 
(EU), on the other hand, proposed a joint ILO-WTO Standing Working Forum to deal 
with this matter, while Canada suggested a WTO Working group on the relationship 
between appropriate trade, development, social and environmental policy choices, in 
the context of globalization. Again, opposition from developing economies, but also 
from some industrialized countries, blocked the American intention. Moreover, 
President Clinton’s statement about endorsing trade sanctions in order to enforce labor 
standard was to a large extent responsible for the failure of the Seattle Ministerial to 
launch the Millenium Round. 
 
The Doha Ministerial Meeting reached a compromise on the issue for the time being. 
The Declaration went back to the original commitment undertaken at Singapore in 
1996, practically taking the issue of labor and trade out of the sphere of the WTO by 
effectively recognizing the competence of the ILO in this field4. 
                                                           
     3  The paragraph referring to labor standards in the Singapore Declaration states: “We renew our 
commitment to the observance of internationally recognized labor standards. The International Labor 
Organization (ILO) is the competent body to ‘set and deal’ with these standards, and we affirm our 
support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered by 
increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject 
the use of labor standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of 
countries, particularly low wage developing countries must in no way be put into question. In this regard, 
we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration” (WTO, 1996). 
 
4 The Declaration says in its 8th paragraph: “We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference regarding internationally recognized core labor standards. We take note of work 
 
At the regional level, the United States’ government pushed to include the 
signature of a side agreement on labor cooperation within the framework of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in order to overcome criticisms and 
complaints from unions and even his own party, and thus secure the approval of 
NAFTA in the American Senate. In the same vein, Chile and Canada signed, jointly with 
a free trade agreement, a side agreement on labor topics, very much alike the North 
American Agreement of Labor Cooperation. 
 
The Labor Standards Debate 
 
Labor standards can be defined as “the norms and rules that govern working 
conditions and industrial relations” (Mah, 1997: 774). The idea of “international labor 
standards” from an economic perspective is, in turn, closely related to the demands for 
policy harmonization in order to “level the playing field” and avoid unfair competitive 
advantages.  
 
Labor standards are expressed in the Conventions and Recommendations 
emanated from the ILO.5 Up to date, the ILO has established 184 Conventions which 
country members choose whether or not to adopt. Although they are binding for those 
members that ratify them, the ILO does not have any enforcement mechanism to 
persuade or force countries to fulfill their obligations6. In other words, not necessarily 
ratification translates into effective compliance. Paradoxically, the main promoter of 
international labor standards, the United States, have only signed and ratified a few 
Conventions. Among those rejecting the inclusion of labor issues in the WTO Agenda, 
many point to the ILO as the appropriate body for the treatment of these matters. 
However, given this organization’s lack of enforcing power and difficulties to build 
                                                                                                                                                                          
under way in the International Labor Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of globalization (WTO, 
2001). 
5 This institution was created in 1919, just after the end of the First World War. Its primary goals 
include the promotion and protection of human rights in regards to the improvement of working 
conditions. One reason accounting for its creation was the need to prevent social and political disruption 
that could endanger international peace, arising from labor dissatisfaction. Not only governments, but also 
business and unions are represented at the ILO. The diversity in the membership and the tripartite nature 
of representation, have resulted in the difficult to reach consensus over trade and labor issues. 
 
   6 Although there is a complaint procedure available for governments, business and union delegates, 
the procedure has never resulted in the application of sanctions (Woolcock, 1995). 
internal consensus, such a stance favors to a certain extent the maintenance of the 
status quo. This point of view was reinforced by the 1997 International Conference on 
Labor, where many developing countries rejected several initiatives seeking to 
strengthen the ILO surveillance process (Bensusán and Damgaard, 1999). 
 
In 1998, this organization adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work. This document states four sets of principles and rights, which ILO 
members are committed to respect, and discards the use of labor standards with 
protectionist aims. These principles and rights include five core labor standards and are 
also contained in the ILO Conventions as shown in Table 1.7 
 
Table 1. Core Labor Standards and ILO Conventions 
Labor Standard ILO Convention 
•  Freedom of association 
•  Right to organize and collectively bargain 
•  Right to form organizations and negotiate freely their 
working conditions with employers  
Conventions 87 and 98 
•  Prohibition of all forms of forced labor Conventions 29 and 105 
•  Non discrimination in employment Conventions 100 and 111 
•  Child Labor Conventions 138 and 182 
Source: OECD (2001), Panagariya (2000) and Mah (1997) 
 
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) holds a 
similar criterion, posing five core labor standards that are universally accepted. These 
include the prohibition of forced labor, freedom of association, the right to organize 
and bargain collectively, elimination of child labor and nondiscrimination in 
employment. Other standards like minimum wage, occupational health and safety in 
the workplace are deemed as less accepted universally. 
 
The trade-labor issue has raised a heated theoretical debate which revolves 
around two main questions. Firstly, whether low labor standards favor exports and 
FDI. If empirical evidence reveals that sub-standards labor practices are positively 
                                                           
        7 For an interesting analysis of ILO provisions see Moran (2001). 
associated with export performance and FDI attraction, developing countries would 
have an unfair competitive advantage and then it would be reasonable to level the 
playing field in order to counter-balance “social dumping”. The second relevant 
question refers to the means to reach such a leveling. Main points at stake in this 
regard concern whether a harmonization of labor standards should be sought, who 
should be in charge of enforcing them and which kind of incentives should be used to 
promote the accomplishment of those standards.  
 
Arguments in favor of some common “floor” for labor standards involve both 
ethical and economic considerations (Garay, 1998). Ethical concerns have been present 
since the late nineteenth century in the struggles for workers’ rights. This 
argumentation is based on the concept of human nature. Labor standards are in this 
sense linked to universal human rights and the notion of core labor standards 
expresses the idea of a minimum set of workers’ rights, which are not related to the 
level of development and should not be trespassed. 
 
The economic argument, as said before, heavily relies on the notion of “social 
dumping” contending that low-labor standard countries enjoy an unfair competitive 
advantage, which distorts trade and leads to a decline of labor rights/earnings in the 
developed economies.8 The argument is sometimes extended to FDI by posing that low 
labor standards favor the attraction of foreign capital eager to resort to cheap labor for 
production, thus placing at disadvantage those countries in which better labor practices 
prevail. In addition, there is the inherent risk of a “race to the bottom” as labor rights 
in industrialized countries could be eroded as a result of the continuous search for 
competitiveness. The argument therefore entails a sort of Gresham’s law application to 
labor practices and rules: low standards drive out higher standards.  
On the other extreme of the debate, opponents to the international 
harmonization of labor standards stress the proteccionist flavor of campaigns favoring 
                                                           
        8  From a theoretical standpoint, this argument builds upon the neoclassical postulate of factor price 
equalization developed within the framework of the Heckscher-Olhin-Samuelson model. This postulate, 
however, has been seriously challenged due to its extremely stringent assumptions, among other, identical 
technologies and tastes among countries, lack of effect from scale economies and incomplete 
specialization. The Stolper-Samuelson model, that points out how salaries change as a result of variations 
in the international prices of goods, is thus considered more appropriate to address the issue. (see, for 
instance, Bhagwati and Kosters, 1994; Deardoff and Hakura, 1994; and Leamer, 1994). 
 
it, as these are seen to be moved by the goal of restricting international competition.9  
Standard trade theory underpins this argument by stating that countries tend to 
specialize in activities in which they enjoy a comparative advantage. Gains from trade 
are therefore positively associated with differences between countries. The more 
different two countries are, the more they will gain from trading. Although in the short  
term, trade liberalization will create winners and losers, gains for winners will surpass 
losses for losers in the long term. The imposition of labor standards would reduce, the 
argument holds, gains from trade by raising the cost of labor. Developing countries 
have a comparative advantage in low-skilled labor (an abundant resource) and 
therefore, they specialize in labor-intensive goods, while industrialized countries tend 
to specialize in the production of capital-intensive goods. Different levels of 
development account for the differences in labor standards.  
 
In light of these considerations, the introduction of uniform standards would 
create a distortion by imposing artificial costs to consumers (in industrialized countries) 
and producers (in developing countries). Furthermore, labor standards could actually 
harm workers in the developing world. The rise in the cost of labor would translate in 
less jobs (and an increase in unemployment) or a reduction in wages (workers would 
be paying the higher standards out of their salary).10   
 
 Different actors align themselves behind each one of these arguments. Unions 
and development and human rights NGOs have been among the main supporters of 
international labor standards in the developed word. The greatest opposition against 
NAFTA in the early nineties and much more recently against the concession of the 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to the President of the United States, came mainly 
from the AFL-CIO. An empirical study on the NAFTA voting in Congress shows that 
labor interest groups made representatives move away from free trade (Conybeare 
and Zinkula, 1996). Krueger (1996) analyzed Congress voting on the Child Labor 
                                                           
        9 A counter-argument frequently used to dismiss this claim is that most of the low wage, low skilled 
intensive products that might be subject to some sort of sanction for labor violations are no longer widely 
produced in developed countries. Thus, any effort to amend that violation will simply shift production of 
the goods involved among places in the developing world. 
 
       10 Sometimes it is also raised the point that any enforcement of higher labor standards through trade 
sanctions would harm not only workers that are being mistreated at sub-standard locations when their 
exports are blocked but also workers whose work is properly treated.   
Deterrence Act and found that representatives from states with higher union rates 
were more likely to cosponsor the Bill. He suggests two alternative explanations:  
workers in unionized sectors try to prevent foreign competition from eroding their 
rents; unionized workers and their representatives are worried generally about labor 
rights. 
 
 Although it is true that unions and import-competing firms from the north might 
be interested in restricting imports from the south, it is not less true that concern for 
labor rights has also arose among students with humanitarian intentions. The fact that 
the trade-labor agenda seems to be biased against the inclusion of certain issues, such 
as migrant labor, reinforces the distrust from developing countries. 
 
Governments from many developing countries subscribe the view of a disguised  
sort of protectionism from developed nations behind the demands for labor standards 
harmonization or the introduction of social clauses in free trade agreements. It must be 
noted in this sense that developing countries’ opposition to labor standards does not 
mean an endorsement to exploitation, but rather, that they are fearful of placing an 
instrument that may be used with protectionist aims by other countries, thereby 
creating another obstacle for their products’ market access. Unions in the developing 
world despite their opposition to trade liberalization have not been generally supportive 
of international labor standards. The Third World Network, for instance, assumes that 
the promotion of international labor standards by the industrialized West attempts to 
blame cheap labor costs in Southern countries for unemployment, rather than pointing 
at technological change (Candland, 2002). 
 
 This controversy reflects, to a large extent, the complexities and nuances 
surrounding the debate. Actually, the issue may be even more intricate than the 
debate suggests. Indeed, although usually posed as an issue dividing developed and 
developing countries, wide disparities in labor rights between countries are frequently 
not as evident as they are within regions of the same country or from industry to 
industry. In other words, the issue might well cut across national borders and, more 
strikingly, levels of development. 
 
 
The (missing?) link between trade and labor standards 
  
 Efforts to better grasp the link between trade and labor standards and 
rigorously assess its implications have proliferated in the last years, although they have 
fallen short of providing definitive answers to the question. Several factors account for 
these modest results.  
 
To begin with, the very concept of “core labor standards” has not been free of 
criticisms on different grounds. As one author has stated: “This term gives the 
impression that the standards covered by it must be so basic that there could hardly be 
any disagreement on their desirability. Yet, the matter is not so simple. As Bhagwati 
[1995] argues cogently, once we get past slavery, universally agreed labor standards 
simply do not exist” (Panagariya, 2000: 10). The moral argumentation can be also 
attacked as a “northern” perception of fundamental rights and, therefore, can be quite 
easily depicted as a “value-related argument for suspending another country’s trading 
rights’ already protected” (Woolcock, 1995: 32). Further, ethical arguments in favor of 
labor standards entail the risk of readily relying on sanctions as a way of promoting the 
accomplishment of standards. In other words, there are certain rights that are 
independent of the level of development and therefore should be universally enforced.  
 
When economic arguments are considered various reasons recommend 
cautiousness. A first problem lies in the fact that labor standards have proven highly 
difficult to measure, since no proxy appears to fully grasp the concept and existing 
ones are extremely difficult to be compared. Rodrik (1997), for instance, uses seven 
indicators to measure labor standards: the total number of ILO Conventions ratified by 
a country; the number of ILO Conventions ratified by a country among six conventions 
relating to “basic workers’ rights”; a synthetic indicator combining indicators of civil 
liberties and political rights; an indicator for child labor; the statutory hours of work in 
a normal working week in manufacturing and construction; the annual days of leave 
with pay in manufacturing and the percentage of labor force which is unionized1. The 
OECD constructed a labor standard indicator based on labor regulations in eighteen 
OECD countries (Van Beers, 1998). The indicator is an index resulting from the 
addition of partial indices, which measure the stringency of government regulation in 4 
variables: working time, employment contracts, minimum wages, and workers’ 
representation rights. The index ranges from zero to ten. The lower the index, the less 
strict the labor regulations a country has. 
 
A second problem, is that the difficulty in finding a valid and reliable measure of 
labor standards affects negatively the ability to reach any conclusive statement about 
the issue. The final result is that there is no definite evidence yet regarding the 
influence of labor standards on export performance and FDI attraction, as well as the 
impact of trade with developing countries on the labor markets of their developed 
counterparts (i.e., job losses or salary reductions). That is, empirical studies cannot, 
firstly, establish a clear association between low labor standards and a better record in 
export performance –fact that is confirmed by the experience of many developing 
countries itself. Neither those studies can convincingly show that, in line with the 
intuitive expectation, countries with higher standards are more attractive to FDI (Stern, 
1999; Rodrik, 1997)11. Finally, empirical studies have not been able to assert the 
determining role of international trade (in particular with developing countries) in the 
evolution of developed countries’ labor markets (specially, low-skilled segments) vis-â-
vis other factors such as technological change, educational and training policies and so 
on.  
 
Similarly, the argument about the race to the bottom is challenged from 
different angles. To begin with, there is the fact that states within the United States 
differ in the stringency of their labor regulations but a race towards the lowest 
common denominator concerning labor protection has not ensued (Krueger, 1996). In 
addition, it is not necessary that the “race” will take place as there are different ways 
to prevent it. For instance, currency devaluation can reduce domestic costs in foreign 
currency terms and a wage downward adjustment also results in a reduction of labor 
costs. The other way around, the government can pay for higher standards through a 
tax increase (Rodrik, 1997). Furthermore, the OECD (2000) also highlights constraints 
to the race to the bottom: “Any firm that attempts to gain a competitive advantage by 
cutting benefits without paying increased money wages is essentially trying to cut  
                                                           
        11  It is interesting to note in this regard the increasing relevance in the past decade of new 
attraction factors, usually labeled as “strategic assets”, that has little to do with labor costs, including the 
wages below the workers’ marginal value product. In competitive markets, pressure 
from other employers will ultimately force the firm to return to the original level if the 
firm expects to be able to hire workers.” Finally, it appears that core labor standards 
are usually lower in non-tradable rather than tradable sectors. Those industries often 
deemed as worse for labor rights (textiles, carpets, garment, footwear, etc.) not 
always enjoy a large share of their countries exports (Carnegie Foundation, 2000).  
 
From an institutional standpoint, certain labor standards can improve labor 
market efficiency and generate positive spillovers for the rest of society. Labor 
standards create incentives for entrepreneurs to seek productivity increases and invest 
in human resources (Bensusán-Damgaard, 1999). Free and democratic unions and 
collective bargaining impact positively on productivity by fostering cooperation and 
trust between employers and employees (Zoninsein, 2000). Collective bargaining, it is 
argued, can enhance the operation of the labor market and have positive political side 
effects (Krueger, 1996). Much more important, labor standards promote a more 
equitable distribution of the benefits from trade liberalization. A central element of the 
institutionalist argument is that a new institutionalization can ensure a more equitable 
distribution of the gains from trade, thereby granting a greater legitimacy for trade 
liberalization. The right to organize and collective bargain allow for the presence of 
representative unions, which is fundamental for the strengthening of a democratic 
society. Empirical evidence, however, has not confirmed the hypothesis that higher 
labor standards enhance productivity, and may even be counterproductive in certain 
occasions (Krueger, 1996).  
 
It has been argued in favor of an international harmonization of labor standards 
that they could be useful for correcting market failures. Lack of information, unequal 
market power, discrimination based on race or gender among others, are reasons 
often cited as sources of market failure. However, it is arguable that harmonization 
would enhance market efficiency, since this would imply assuming that market failures 
are uniform across countries (Krueger, 1996; Stern, 1999). Harmonization could result, 
therefore, in considerable damage for the intended beneficiaries of higher labor 
standards.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
skill level of the labor force, I&D facilities, educational standards, etc. (See, for instance, Chudnovsky and 
López, 2000).   
Hemispheric Approaches to Labor Standards 
 
Despite the fact that the trade-labor linkage appears to be an unresolved issue 
at the multilateral level, this has not prevented the emergence of regional or bilateral 
instruments on this matter. The most important initiatives of economic integration 
within the Americas suggest that there is no an unique road to deal with differentials in 
labor standards, as they embrace approaches that differ in various dimensions. The 
first distinguishing aspect concerns whether or not the integration scheme includes a 
supranational instance of labor law harmonization. The second concerns whether or 
not such a scheme includes mechanisms to enforce existing labor standards, 
particularly trade sanctions. 
 
Within the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) the issue has been part of 
the negotiation agenda. The idea of a social clause linked with the FTAA, however, was 
discarded by the Buenos Aires Ministerial Declaration: “We reiterate that one of our 
general objectives is to strive to make our trade liberalization and environmental 
policies mutually supportive, taking into account the work undertaken by the World 
Trade Organization and other international organizations, and to further secure, in 
accordance with our respective laws and regulations, the observance and promotion of 
worker rights, renewing our commitment to the observance of internationally 
recognized core labor standards, and acknowledging that the International Labor 
Organization is the competent body to set and deal those core labor standards” (FTAA 
Buenos Aires Ministerial Declaration, 2001: paragraph 4). The Declaration, although  
setting respect for labor standards as a goal of FTAA countries, rejects harmonization 
in the hemisphere and leaves in the hands of the ILO the management of labor issues. 
Latin American governments have rejected at the multilateral and regional level the 
entwining of trade and labor. 
 
Largely because of the pressure exerted by American trade unions during the 
NAFTA debate, the US, Mexico and Canada signed the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation (NAALC). This side agreement regulates labor issues among NAFTA 
countries. The treaty does not aim to harmonize the domestic legislation of country 
members, but to ensure that each country respects its own domestic norms. The 
declaration of principles of the NAALC includes almost all basic labor rights. However, 
only trade related persistent violations in mutually recognized labor laws can be 
brought to a panel of experts. Furthermore, only violation of “technical norms” such as 
safety and health at the workplace, minimal wages and child labor is subject to 
evaluation. The violation, for instance. of the right to associate and collective bargain, 
the main concern for labor advocates in Mexico, is not a matter of trial. The dispute 
settlement procedure provided by the agreement is lengthy and its sanctions are 
negligible (0.007% of the value of trade between sides). Under the terms of the 
NAALC, any person or organization can complain about violations to another member 
country’s national labor law. The complainant has no access, however, to the dispute 
settlement procedure but must has to resort to his own government which, after 
deciding to act on a complaint, brings the matter for consultation to the council of 
labor ministers. The Commission for Labor Cooperation is the main body created by the 
NAALC. Also, the agreement provides the establishment of National Administrative 
Offices in each country.  
 
The NAALC has been severely criticized by labor advocates for being too soft. 
However, it is also true that it has been useful for enhancing transparency in labor 
affairs (Bensusán-Damgaard, 1999). In the same vein, Chile and Canada signed jointly 
with a free trade agreement a treaty on labor cooperation following a similar approach 
to NAALC’s. This treaty practically replicates the NAALC and its consultation and 
dispute settlement procedure. 
 
Initially, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) did not include social 
issues in its agenda. This situation was amended in 1993 when a Working Group on 
labor affairs was created. This group was given the task of identifying main 
asymmetries between members and releasing proposals towards a harmonization of 
labor legislation within the block. The main instrument to achieve this goal was the 
ratification by all four members of a series of ILO Conventions. After the Ouro Preto 
Protocol of 1995, negotiations among countries pointed to the signature of a Social 
Charter for MERCOSUR, a long-standing demand of MERCOSUR unions. In the end, 
parties agreed to issue a Declaration, with the aim of avoiding the use of binding 
conventions with protectionist goals. The Socio-Labor Declaration of 1998 is an 
enunciation of workers’ rights that includes not only core labor standards, but also the 
right to strike and the right to an unemployment insurance, among others. The 
Declaration creates the MERCOSUR Socio-Labor Commission that is in charge of the 
surveillance of the Declaration. The Declaration has, nevertheless, a fundamental flaw: 
its provisions cannot be invoked in commercial, economic and financial matters; 
therefore, it is inconsequential in terms of harmonization or enforcement of labor 
standards in trade-related matters. For this reason, the recommendation to sign and 
ratify 34 ILO Treatises, submitted by Working Sub-Group 10 to authorities, could be 
more relevant in practical terms. At the time of writing, all four members have already 
ratified 11 of these 34 Treaties. This could be the first step towards the creation of a 
minimum framework of labor standards within the trade bloc on the basis of an 
approach that is more piecemeal and does not involve in practice the surrendering of 
authority to any intergovernmental instance to broker or supervise labor standards. 
However, the current crisis of the MERCOSUR economies, which has led the trade bloc 
to an impasse, and the non-binding nature of the Declaration have seriously affected 
this topic’s further progress inside the bloc. 
 
Instruments for the promotion of labor standards 
 
Instruments for the promotion of labor standards range from corporate codes 
of conduct and labeling to trade sanctions. Labeling places the responsibility on the 
consumer, who ultimately will decide if he is willing to pay a surplus for a good 
produced under high labor standards. From this perspective, labor standards become a 
private good: consumers pay for what they consider as morally acceptable. It should 
be underscored that labeling prevents a protectionist use of labor standards, leaving 
the final decision with the individual. Several surveys have shown that in the United 
States people are willing to pay more (up to a 30% in a 100 US$ product) for a good 
that is produced under sound labor conditions (Freeman, 2001). 
 
NGOs have promoted the improvement of labor standards through campaigns 
and boycotts against companies accused of exploiting workers and violating their rights 
in the workplace. The anti-sweatshop campaign against brands like Philip Van Heusen 
or Gap for the working conditions in their Central American factories or sub-contracting 
firms is a good example of NGO/Human Rights Groups activities in this field. United 
States Fruit companies like Chiquita or Del Monte have also been the focus of major 
NGO activism. Partly as a reaction to avoid the damage that knowledge of this kind of 
facts could cause upon their sales, firms have adopted codes of conduct that establish 
a set of principles governing labor relations inside the company. Notorious cases of this 
behaviors include Levi’s, Wal-Mart, Nike and Reebok among others. 
 
Punitive measures entail the adoption of trade sanctions against countries that 
do not respect core labor standards. This type of measures can be unilaterally or 
multilaterally imposed. Within the first type, it is worth highlighting the case of the 
United States trade legislation, which contemplates the imposition of sanctions in case 
of worker rights violations. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 establishes the failure to 
adopt internationally recognized workers’ rights as a cause for a denial of trade 
preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The 1988 Trade and 
Competitiveness Act considers the persistent denial of workers rights as a reason for 
trade retaliation (Latin American Economic System, 1994). The use of unilateral action 
is not, however, free of criticisms. A crucial point in this regards is that the use of trade 
sanctions as a foreign policy instrument has blurred the ideal of promoting labor rights. 
Moral objectives thus become obscured or spoiled  by realpolitik considerations. 
 
Sanctions imposed at the multilateral level dovetail with the idea of creating a 
WTO-based regime on labor standards. This would be achieved through an expansion 
of the general exemptions under Article XX or the negotiation of a new specific 
agreement. Unlike the softness of ILO provisions, proponents of this solution underline 
that the WTO has a “big stick”, as a result of the imposition of trade sanctions to the 
country in which substandard working conditions prevail. Very roughly, the system 
would work in this way: a country could file a complaint against another when the 
latter fails to provide and enforce any of the core labor standards, opening an 
investigation and dispute settlement procedure. The ILO assistance would be needed 
at this stage, as the WTO has not competency in investigating or adjudicating 
workplace conflicts. If a violation were found and the dispute-settlement mechanism 
were not able to rectify it, the complaining country (or eventually all WTO members if 
action were taken on a multilateral basis) would be allowed to apply trade sanctions 
(suspend trade obligations, impose quantitative restrictions or higher tariffs on that 
country’s exports). 
A WTO-based regime of this type has been challenged on various grounds. A 
first one is that the remedy can be worst than the illness as actions against violation of 
labor standards via trade sanctions threat the jobs of the individuals whose rights and 
well-being the regime is supposed to improve. A second challenge is that trade 
sanctions would probably not discriminate between those exports from the offending 
country involving substandard labor practices and those that do not. As one author has 
put it, “The principal problem with the WTO-centered trade-sanctions system is not 
just that the WTO route is a blunt instrument, but that it relies for its clout on 
deliberately orchestrated efforts to interrupt host countries activities that extend 
upward and outward from the lowest-skilled ‘dead end’ jobs: semi-skilled in electronics, 
medical supplies, auto parts production, chemicals, machine tools, industrial equipment 
and data processing services are put at risk to improve substandard conditions at 
plants producing garments, footwear, toys, garden tools, or soccer balls” (Moran, 
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